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ABSTRACT
Machine learning (ML) classifiers used for static portable executable
(PE) malware detection typically employ single numerical feature
vector representations of each file as input with one or more target
labels per file during training. However, there is much orthogonal
information that can be gleaned from the context in which the
file was seen. In this paper, we propose utilizing a static source of
contextual information – namely the path of the PE file – as an
auxiliary input to the classifier. While file paths are not malicious or
benign in and of themselves, they do provide valuable context for
a malicious/benign determination, for example malware droppers
may choose file paths to avoid disk scans or select paths that a user
is likely to click. Unlike dynamic contextual information, which
requires high CPU and runtime overhead, file paths are available
with little overhead and can seamlessly be integrated into a multi-
view static ML detector, potentially yielding higher detection rates
at very high throughput with minimal infrastructural changes.
Here we propose a multi-view neural network, which takes
feature vectors from the PE file content as well as corresponding
file paths as inputs and outputs a detection score. To ensure realistic
evaluation, we use a commercial-scale dataset of approximately
10 million samples – files and file paths from user endpoints of an
actual security vendor network.We then conduct an interpretability
analysis via LIME modeling to ensure that our classifier has learned
a sensible representation and see which parts of the file path most
contributed to change in the classifier’s score. We find that our
model learns useful aspects of the file path for classification, while
also learning artifacts from customers testing the vendor’s product,
e.g., by downloading a directory of malware samples each named
as their hash. We prune these artifacts from our test dataset and
demonstrate reductions in false negative rate of 32.3% at a 10−3 false
positive rate (FPR) and 33.1% at 10−4 FPR, over a similar topology
single input PE file content only model.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Commercial Portable Executable (PE) malware detectors consist of
a hybrid of static and dynamic analysis engines. Static detection –
which is fast and effective at detecting a large fraction of malware –
is usually first employed to flag suspicious samples. Static detection
involves analyzing the raw PE image on disk and can be performed
very quickly, but it is vulnerable to code obfuscation techniques,
e.g., compression and polymorphic/metamorphic transformation
[28].
Dynamic detection, by contrast, requires running the PE in an
emulator and analyzing behavior at run time [13]. When dynamic
analysis works, it is less susceptible to code obfuscation, but takes
substantially greater computational capacity and time to execute
than static methods. Moreover, some files are difficult to execute
in an emulated environment, but can still be statically analyzed.
Consequently, static detection methods are typically the most criti-
cal part of an endpoint’s malware prevention (blocking malware
before it executes) pipeline.
Static detection methods have seen performance advancements
recently, thanks to the adoption of machine learning [10], where
highly expressive classifiers, e.g., deep neural networks, are fit on
labeled data sets of millions of files. When these classifiers are
trained, they use feature vectors – numerical descriptions of the
static file content – as input but no auxiliary data. We note, however,
that dynamic analysis works well precisely because of auxiliary data
– e.g., network traffic, system calls, etc. – information that cannot
be gleaned directly from the static content of the file.
In this work, we seek to use file paths, as orthogonal input in-
formation to augment static ML detectors. File paths are available
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statically, without any additional instrumentation of the OS, and
are already used internally by malware analysts to correct and in-
vestigate mischaracterized detections. Using file paths to augment
detections on the surface seems potentially problematic, as file
paths are not inherently malicious or benign. However, malware
droppers often use file paths with certain characteristics for a vari-
ety of reasons. For example, a file path may be chosen to increase
the likelihood that a user will execute a malicious PE masquerad-
ing as another application, to avoid disk scans, or to hide the files
from a user’s view. This results in a prevalence of certain types of
directory hierarchies, and detectable naming characteristics (e.g.,
name randomization), which can provide useful hints about the
malicious/benign nature of a file, even when this is not immedi-
ately obvious from its content. Likewise, file paths corresponding
to prevalent types of benignware exhibit certain patterns. By in-
cluding the file path as an auxiliary input, we are able to combine
information about the file, via feature vectors, with information
about how likely it is to see such a file in that specific location.
We focus our analysis on three models:
• The baseline file content only PE model, which takes only
the PE features as input and outputs a malware confidence
score.
• Another baseline file path content only FP model, which
takes only the file’s file paths as input and outputs a malware
confidence score.
• Our proposed multi-view PE file content + contextual file
path PE+FP model, which takes in both the PE file content
features and file paths, and also outputs a malware confi-
dence scores.
A schematic diagram of the three models is shown in Figure 1.
Rather than using vendor aggregation services for our data distri-
bution, which potentially have an artificial file distribution – i.e., not
reflecting a real world deployment case – and incomplete filepath
information, we collect a commercial dataset of actual file and file
paths scans on customer endpoints from a large anti-malware ven-
dor, and use them to perform a time split validation of our models.
In addition, we conduct a LIME interpretability analysis [36] to
see what aspects of the file path amplify or attenuate detection
on the multi-view model. We find that, while the model learns to
detect suspicious aspects of the file path, it also learns to detect
artifacts which seem to correspond to vendor’s customers perform-
ing internal testing the of the product. These artifacts include, e.g.,
files named by their SHA256 digests, in folders marked “malware”,
which were likely bulk-downloaded intentionally. While this is
indeed the actual customer distribution, and not data pollution, we
do not think detecting vendor tests is an accurate representation of
the real world threat landscape. We therefore prune these samples
from our test set during evaluation, to avoid presenting a spuriously
optimistic view of performance. We find that even after we filter our
data, our multi-view classifier trained on both file content and the
contextual file path yields statistically significantly better results
across the ROC curve and particularly in low false positive rate
(FPR) regions.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) We obtain a realistic carefully curated data set of files and file
paths from a security vendor’s customer endpoints (rather
than a malware / vendor label aggregation service), and
carefully prune our test set of “easy” samples from customer
test endpoints that do not constitute realistic threats in the
wild.
(2) We demonstrate that our multi-view PE+FP malware clas-
sifier performs substantially better on our dataset than a
model that uses the file contents alone.
(3) We extend Local Interpretable Model Agnostic Explanations
(LIME) [36] to our PE+FPmodel, and use it to interpret which
portions of the file path contribute and detract the most from
a detection.
(4) We demonstrate the suitability of PE+FP model as a ranking
engine in the context of Endpoint Detection and Response
(EDR) applications.
The remainder of thismanuscript is structured as follows: Section
2 covers important background concepts and related work. Section
3 discusses data set collection and model formulation. Section 4
presents an evaluation comparing our novel multi-view approach
to a baseline content-only model of similar topology. Section 5
contains a discussion of our results and an interpretability analysis
of our model Section 6 concludes.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In this section, we describe how machine learning is commonly
applied to static PE detection and how our approach differs, in a high
level sense, by providing contextual information as an auxiliary
input. We then present related work in other machine learning
domains.
2.1 Static ML Malware Detection
Machine learning has been applied in the computer security domain
formany years now [38], but disruptive performance breakthroughs
in static PE models using ML at the commercial scale are a more
recent phenomenon. Commercial models typically rely on deep
neural networks [42] or boosted decision tree ensembles [2] and
have been extended to other static file types as well, including web
content [43, 44], office documents [41], and archives [41]. While
methods for dealing with these different input types have their
own intricacies, they typically use single inputs derived from file
content as a feature vector or text embedding.
Static ML detectors use highly parametric classifiers trained
on many malicious and benign samples. The goal is to tune the
parameters of these classifiers to best match the outputs from the
classifiers for all input samples to their actual ground truth labels.
Provided that the malware/benignware samples in the training set
are similar enough in content to those seen at deployment and that
the samples are well labeled, the learned detection function should
work well.
In practice, labels are often collected from vendor aggregation
feeds, which submit samples to malware detectors from a variety of
vendors. The results can be aggregated into labels that are usually
correct, e.g., by using a 1-/5+ criterion [42] or treating the label as
a hidden variable and using statistical estimation methods [12, 24].
Often a time lag is introduced to let vendors update their models,
blacklists, and whitelists accordingly. Generally, the longer the time
lag, the more accurate the labels, but the less the data resembles
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(a) File content only (PE) model.
(b) File path content only (FP) model.
(c) File content + contextual file path (PE + FP) model.
Figure 1: Schematic outline of the three approaches that we
compare in this paper. (a) A PE content (PE) malware detec-
tor, where only static features extracted directly from the
PE file are fed to a feed-forward neural network (FFNN). (b)
A file path only (FP) malware detector, where the path of
each corresponding file is used to determine if that file is
malicious or benign. The raw characters are embedded and
processed by a series of convolutional layers before being
passed to a series of fully connected (FC) layers. (c) Our novel
multi-view approach, where we combine file content with
contextual information from the file path (PE+FP). File con-
tent features are passed through the same feed-forward neu-
ral network base (FFNN Base) layers as in (a) while the file
path is passed through the same convolutional neural net-
work base layers (CNN Base) as in (b). The outputs of these
base layers are concatenated together and passed through a
series of fully connected layers. Parameters of the separate
input paths are jointly optimized. All models output scores
between 0 and 1, which represent the confidence of whether
a file is malicious.
that of the deployment distribution. In actual deployment contexts,
classifiers are retrained on new data/labels periodically and the
updated parameters are sent to the endpoints onwhich the detectors
are running.
Most static ML for information security (ML-Sec) classifiers oper-
ate on learned embeddings over portions of files (e.g., headers) [35],
learned embeddings over the full file [34], or most commonly, on
pre-engineered numerical feature vectors designed to summarize the
content from each file [1, 11, 19, 20, 27, 30, 42, 49]. Learned embed-
dings, which generally presume some sort of convolutional architec-
ture, have the advantage that they do not presume a fixed structure
and are derived directly during training. However, this process is
significantly more expensive, and does not scale as gracefully, e.g.,
to tens to hundreds of millions of large PE files. Moreover generic
bytes are inherently less constrained than inputs like images, video,
audio, and text, where convolutions can take advantage of struc-
tural localities/heirarchies. Thus, for generic malicious/benign files
there is less performance benefit from learning to embed features
directly from inputs. Pre-engineered feature vector representations,
by contrast quickly distill content from each file that is informative
in a classificaiton sense. There are a number of ways to craft feature
vectors, including tracking per-byte statistics over sliding windows
[1, 42], byte histograms[1, 2], ngram histograms [27], treating bytes
as pixel values in an image (a visualization of the file content) [1, 27],
opcode and function call graph statistics[1], symbol statistics[1],
hashed/numerical metadata values [1, 2, 42] – e.g., entry-point as a
fraction of the file, or hashed imports and exports, – and hashes of
delimited tokens [11, 41]. In practical applications, several differ-
ent types of feature vectors extracted from file content are often
concatenated together to achieve superior performance.
Along a similar vein, our work uses a concatenation of features
derived from the content of a PE file as an input to a neural network,
but in contradistinction to previous work we add a secondary input
which includes contextual information – namely the PE file path.
The PE content input is passed through a series of hidden layers
while the file path is passed through a convolutional embedding.
Both inputs are ultimately concatenated together into a common
“stem” of hidden layers. The final malicious/benign output score
is obtained by passing the final dense layer output (a 1-D scalar)
through a sigmoid activation function. This is depicted in schematic
form in Figure 1.
2.2 Learning from Multiple Sources
Related research in static ML malware detection using deep neural
networks has examined learning from multiple sources of infor-
mation but the approaches are fundamentally different from ours:
Huang et al. [21] and Rudd et al. [39] use multi-objective learning
[7, 40] over multiple auxiliary loss functions which they found
increased performance on the main malware detection task. Specifi-
cally, Huang et al. introduced an auxiliary categorical cross entropy
loss function on mutually exclusive malware family labels, while
Rudd et al. introduced several loss functions, including a multi-
target binary cross entropy loss over multiple malicious/benign
detection sources, a Poisson loss over total detection counts from
all malicious/benign sources, and a multi-target binary cross en-
tropy loss over semantic malware attribute tags (e.g., ‘ransomware’,
‘trojan’, ‘dropper’ etc.). While both of these works use multiple
target labels derived from metadata about the malicious sample in
question, only a single input summarizing the content of the sample
is provided. Even if the auxiliary labels provide some contextual
information to guide the training process, the classification decision
itself is still made purely from the content at deployment.
Our approach utilizes multiple input types/modalities – one
which describes the content of the malicious sample, in the form of
a PE feature vector similar to [42], and another which feeds the path
of the file to an embedding (similar to [43]) which provides infor-
mation on where that sample was seen. This technique is a type of
multi-view learning [48]. As the name might suggest, the majority
of applications of multi-view learning are in computer vision, where
the multiple views literally consist of views from different input
cameras/sensors or different views from the same camera/sensor at
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different times. Early applications were targeted towards detection,
localization, and recognition problems [23, 26, 47], 2D and 3D mod-
eling and alignment [6, 9, 18, 22, 46], and surveillance and tracking
[5]. Later, multi-vew solutions to these problems became popular
using deep neural networks [14, 45]. Other common applications
of multi-view learning, both in and outside of the computer vision
space, include cross-spectral fusion [33], joint textual/visual content
representation for image tagging and retrieval[17], Joint modeling
of web page text and inbound hyperlinks [4], and multi-lingual
modeling [15] to name a few.
As discussed in Section 2.1, combining different feature types
via concatenation is a common practice in ML-Sec [37], but these
approaches – by and large – provide different filters on the same
content from each file; they do not add contextual information
from different input sources. We could only find two approaches
in the ML-Sec space which specifically reference themselves as
multi-view: namely [29], in which Narayanan et al. applied multiple
kernel learning over dependency graphs for Android malware clas-
sification and [3], in which Bai et al. used multi-view ensembles for
PE malware detection [3]. While these approaches are in some ways
similar to ours, they do not use deep learning or contextual infor-
mation that is exogenous to the malicious/benign files themselves.
We are the first, to our knowledge, to perform multi-view modeling
for malware detection at commercial data using exogenous file path
information fed in conjunction with file content to a deep neural
network.
3 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
In this section we present implementation details of our approach,
including the data collection process for obtaining PE files and file
paths from customer endpoints, our featurization strategy, and the
architectures of our multi-view deep neural network and compari-
son baselines.
3.1 Dataset
For our experiments, we collected training, testing, and validation
datasets from a prominent anti-malware vendor’s telemetry. This
telemetry contains the filepaths and SHA256 digests of portable
executable (PE) files seen on their customer endpoints, along with
time stamps and other metadata. The telemetry did not contain the
raw files due to bandwidth and customer privacy considerations,
and instead we used the SHA256 digests to look up and download
available files from vendor aggregation services. Malicious/benign
labels for these files were computed using a criterion similar to
[42, 43], but combined with additional propriety information to
generate more accurate labeling. Files that we could not label were
removed from the dataset.
We lower-cased all the filepaths for consistency. The file paths
that we received from telemetry had drive letters/paths and user
names replaced with “[drive]” and “[user]” tokens respectively.
This step was necessary in order to to protect Potentially Identifi-
able Information (PII). This obfuscation also has the side benefit of
removing near duplicate file paths. We limited the number of file
paths associated with each unique PE file sample to a maximum
of five first seen paths, in order to avoid “heavy hitter” file paths
dominating our dataset.
In total, we collected approximately 6 months of sampled teleme-
try data after performing the above cleaning operations. We split
this data into training and test datasets based on the time samples
were first seen in our telemetry. Samples that first appeared be-
tween June 1 and November 15 2018 were used for training and
samples first seen during Jan 1 to Jan 30 2019 were used as a test
set. Samples first seen between November 16 and December 1 2018
were used as a validation set to monitor model performance during
training, and for model selection and calibration. Care was taken
to ensure that there were no overlaps between training, validation,
and test sets. The training dataset collected consisted of 9,148,143
distinct samples, with 693,272 of them labeled as malicious. The
test dataset had 249,783 total samples with 38,767 of them labeled
as malicious. The validation set consisted of 2,225,094 samples with
85,041 of them labeled as malicious.
We note that our original test set contained 275,374 samples.
This was reduced to 249,783; by 25,591 samples for the following
reason. During an early interpretability analysis using LIME expla-
nations (see Sections 4.3 and 4.4), we found that a number of files
in our test set exhibited particularly high responses with respect
to malicious/benign score based off of SHA256 digests in the file
path, as well as tokens such as “malware”, “prevalent”, etc. Upon
investigation, we found that these come from our source vendor’s
customers (which may include other IT security organizations) test-
ing its endpoint products – e.g., by downloading folders of malware
and seeing if there are resultant detections. While this is, in a sense,
indicative of a realistic customer endpoint distribution, in our view,
it does not reflect an accurate view of the threat, and including
these samples in the test set could yield spuriously optimistic per-
formance evaluations. We therefore pruned our test set of these
“test endpoint” samples prior to conducting experiments and analy-
sis presented in Section 4. For readers interested in performance
comparisons and LIME analysis on the unpruned test set, these
results are presented in Appendices A.2 and A.3.
3.2 Feature Engineering
In order to use file paths in feed-forward neural network, we first
needed to convert the variable length strings into numeric vectors
of fixed length. We accomplished this using a vectorization scheme
similar to [43], by creating a lookup table keyed on each character
with a numeric value (between 0 and the character set size) repre-
senting each character. In practice, we implemented this table as
a Python dictionary. This transformation required our file paths
to be trimmed to a fixed size in order to make it cost effective to
perform our experiments. Guided by statistics from our telemetry
and early experimentation, we trimmed file paths to the last 100
characters. See Appendix A.1 for further discussion.
In [43], a character set of 100 printable characters is used as
the vocabulary in the lookup table to convert characters to integer
vocabulary indices as part of feature construction. In our work,
we consider the entire unicode (UTF-8) character set, but limit our
vocabulary to 150 most frequently occurring unicode characters,
determined by their frequency counts in our data (See Figure 2).
We also add a single ‘other‘ character that represents all other
Unicode characters not in the top 150, and a special null character
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Figure 2: Distribution of Unicode character frequencies by
prevalence in our telemetry. The x-axis indexes the Unicode
character in terms of prevalence rank (most prevalent to
least prevalent). The y-axis corresponds to frequency. Note
the logarithmic scale on the y-axis. The red vertical line
shows the character rank at which we truncate our vocab-
ulary.
to represent shorter strings, bringing our vocabulary to a final size
of 152.
As features for the content of the PE files, we used floating point
1024-dimensional feature vectors consisting of four distinct feature
types, similar to [42]:
(1) A 256-dimensional (16x16) 2D histogram of windowed en-
tropy values per byte. A window size of 1024 was selected.
(2) A 256-dimensional (16x16), 2D logarithmically scaled string
length/hash histogram.
(3) A 256-dimensional bin of hashes of metadata from the PE
header, including PE metadata, including imports, exports,
etc.
(4) A 256-dimensional (16x16) byte standard deviation/entropy
histogram.
In total, we represent each sample as two feature vectors: a PE
content feature vector of 1024 dimensions and a contextual file path
feature vector of 100 dimensions.
3.3 Network Architectures
Our multi-view architecture is shown in Figure 3. The model has
two inputs, the 1024 element PE content feature vector, xPE , and the
100 element file path integer vector, xF P , as described in Section 3.2.
Each distinct input is passed through a series of layers with their
own parameters, θPE and θF P , for PE features and FP for filepath
features respectively, and are jointly optimized during training. The
outputs of these layers are then joined (concatenated) and passed
through a series of final hidden layers – a joint output path with
parameters θO . The final output of the network consists of a dense
layer followed by a sigmoid activation. Our labeling convention
uses 0 as a benign label and 1 as a malicious label, so sigmoid
outputs close to 1 are more likely to be malicious than outputs close
to 0, which are more likely to be benign. However, the threshold
for malicious/benign determination can be set anywhere along the
(0.0, 1.0) range according false positive rate (FPR) and detection rate
(TPR) tradeoffs for the application at hand – a reasonable threshold
for our use cases is typically at or below 10−3 FPR.
The PE input arm θPE passes xPE through a series of blocks
consisting of four layers each: a Fully Connected layer, a Layer
Normalization layer implemented using the technique described
in [25], a Dropout layer with a dropout probability of 0.05, and an
Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation. Five of these blocks are
connected in sequence with dense layer sizes 1024, 768, 512, 512
and 512 nodes respectively in order.
The file path input arm θF P , passes xF P – a vector of length
100 – into an Embedding layer that converts the integer vector into
a (100,32) embedding. This embedding is then fed into 4 separate
convolution blocks, that contain a 1D convolution layer with 128
filters, a layer normalization layer and a 1D sum layer to flatten the
output to a vector. The 4 convolution blocks contain convolution
layers with filters of size 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively that process 2, 3
4 and 5-grams of the input file path. The flattened outputs of these
convolution blocks are then concatenated and serve as input to two
dense blocks (same form as in the PE input arm).
The outputs from the fully connected blocks from the PE arm
and the file path arm are then concatenated and passed into the
joint output path, parameterized by θO . This path consists of dense
connected blocks (same form as in the PE input arm) of layer sizes
512, 256 and 128. The 128D output of these blocks is then fed to a
dense layer which projects the output to 1D, followed by a sigmoid
activation that provides the final output of the model.
The PE only model is just the PE+FP model but without the FP
arm, taking input xPE and fitting θPE and θO parameters. Similarly,
the FP model is the PE+FP model but without the PE arm, taking
input xF P fitting θF P and θO paramters. The first layer of the output
subnetwork is adjusted appropriately to match the output from the
previous layer.
We fit all models using a binary cross entropy loss function.
Given the output of our deep learning model f (x;θ ) for input x
with label y ∈ {0, 1}, and model parameters θ the loss is:
L(x,y;θ ) = −y log(f (x;θ )) + (1 − y) log(1 − f (x;θ )). (1)
Via an optimizer, we solve for θˆ the optimal set of parameters
that minimize the combined loss over the dataset:
θˆ = argmin
θ
M∑
i=1
L(x(i),yi ;θ ), (2)
whereM is the number of samples in our dataset, and yi and x(i)
are the label and the feature vector of the ith training sample re-
spectively.
We built and trained our models using the Keras framework[8],
using the Adam optimizer with Keras’s default parameters and 1024
sized minibatches. Each model is trained for 15 epochs, which we
determined was enough for the results to converge.
4 EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
We trained three different types of models: two baseline models (PE
and FP) and one multi-view model (PE+FP). The baselines can be
viewed as different ablations of the multi-view model. One baseline
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Figure 3: The neural network model we use in our experiments. Each of the unlabeled blocks contains a fully connected layer,
followed by Layer Normalization and a Dropout Layer. In experiments where we train the file paths and PE features individ-
ually, the respective input and associated input branch is used and the other branch is removed from the model definition.
Table 1: Mean and standard deviation true positive rates (TPRs) on the test set for false positive rates (FPRs) of interest. Results
were aggregated over five training runs with different weight initializations and minibatch orderings. Best results, shown
in bold, consistently occurred when using both feature vectors from the file and contextual file path as inputs. Percentage
reduction in mean detection error in comparison to the PE baseline is shown at the bottom of the table.
FPR
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1
PE+FP (0.992 ± 0.001 AUC) 0.398 ± 0.083 0.558 ± 0.009 0.693 ± 0.005 0.922 ± 0.006 0.978 ± 0.005
PE (0.990 ± 0.002 AUC) 0.208 ± 0.086 0.339 ± 0.059 0.547 ± 0.007 0.889 ± 0.008 0.972 ± 0.007
FP (0.968 ± 0.003 AUC) 0.02 ± 0.022 0.233 ± 0.04 0.522 ± 0.003 0.711 ± 0.003 0.927 ± 0.003
% Error Reduction 24.0 33.1 32.3 30.1 22.6
model (PE) takes only PE feature vectors as inputs while the other
(FP) takes only file paths as inputs. The multi-viewmodel takes both
PE features and file paths as inputs. These model topologies are
described in Section 3. We trained each of these models on the same
samples; only their inputs differed. The PE baseline is characteristic
of a real-world production use case, while the FP baseline should
be viewed as a sanity check to ensure that trivial gains do not occur
over the PE model by using file path information alone.
To get a statistical view of model performance, we trained five
models of each type, with different weight initialization per model,
different minibatch ordering, and different seeds for dropout. This
allows us to assess not only relative performance comparisons
across individual models (as is standard practice), but also mean
performance and uncertainty across model types. Training multiple
models also tells us important information about the stability of
each model type under different initializations.
4.1 Performance Evaluation
Results for the three model types, evaluated on the test set – PE+FP,
PE, and FP – are shown in Figure 4 as ROC curves and are also
summarized in tabular form in in Table 1. Recall that these results
(mean and standard deviation) were assessed over five runs.
We see that the multi-view (PE+FP) model substantially out-
performs the content-only model in terms of net AUC and across
the vast majority of the ROC curve, slightly dipping below the PE
baseline between 10−2 and 10−3 FPR, an effect which could poten-
tially be alleviated with a larger training set. At lower FPRs, the
performance improvements from the PE+FP model compared to
both baselines is substantial. Specifically, we see that there is a
27% increase in True Positive rate for the PE + FP model as op-
posed to the PE model at 10−3 FPR, and a 64% increase at 10−4 FPR.
This increase is also accompanied by a reduction in variance of
performance, making the PE+FP model a better choice in terms of
both stability and overall detection performance. At higher FPR
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Figure 4: Mean ROC curves and standard deviations for our
PE+FP model (red solid line), a PE model (blue dashed line),
and an FP model (green dotted line). Mean and uncertainty
are computed over five runs.
regions, our content-only (PE) model already seems to exhibit very
good performance, with a mean TPR of 0.889, and the multi-view
(PE + FP) model manages to outperform it, albeit slightly, with
a mean TPR of 0.922. As expected, the filepath only (FP) model
that looks only at context consistently performs the worst, with an
overall mean AUC of 0.0968, compared to a mean AUC of 0.992 for
the multi-view (PE + FP) model and a mean AUC of 0.990 for the
content-only (PE) model.
Note that the TPR/FPR metrics that we use to evaluate detection
are invariant to the ratio of malicious to benign samples in our test
set. This invariant representation of results is important, since if we
are to deploy this model in practice, we can use this TPR/FPR ROC
curve to re-calibrate the detector for a a significantly higher ratio
of benign to malware by selecting a threshold associated with a low
FPR (e.g., 10−3), rather than the presumed default 0.5 threshold. It
is also for that reason that in our analysis we focus exclusively on
the low FPR regions of the curve.
At very low FPRs (< 10−4) the variance in the TPR increases.
This is due to inherent measurement noise at low FPRs: an FPR of
10−5 means that 1/100, 000 benign samples were falsely labeled as
malicious, which is the same order of magnitude as the number of
benign samples in our dataset, providing little support for the nu-
merical interpolation used to generate these ROC curves. Moreover,
a small fraction of our test set could potentially be mislabeled. Con-
sequently, results significantly below 10−4 FPR should be treated
with some skepticism. The improvement of the combined model
is still substantially larger than the statistical uncertainty for the
relevant 10−3 to 10−4 FPR regions.
There are two reasons to believe that our test set is more chal-
lenging than than real deployment distributions. The first reason is
that ML detectors are never deployed by themselves, and are instead
guard-railed by signers, prominent file hashes, and AV signature
whitelisting. Most of the prominent FP issues can be suppressed
using these whitelist approaches. The second reason, is that we
removed any previously seen PE file from test set, even it has a new
file path. In the raw telemetry, we observed that most executed files
are actually not new. However, in our view, the primary job of the
ML system is to properly identify previously unseen files, where as
old files can typically be whitelisted or blacklisted. Thus, our evalu-
ation reflects the realistic capability of our respective classifiers to
detect novel malware.
4.2 File Path Influence Analysis
The overall performance gain from using file paths as additional
context information to the neural network model seems evident
from the performance metrics in Section 4.1. In this section, we
analyze the influence that file paths have on an individual model’s
performance, by examining additional detections and false nega-
tives introduced by the file paths (PE+FP model) as compared to a
model that considers only the PE binary features (PE model). To
investigate this, we thresholded detection scores corresponding
to particular FPRs and converted continuous model outputs to a
binary malware/benign decision. For this analysis, we employed a
threshold corresponding to 10−1 FPR.
A word cloud representation of tokens from the file paths which
cause a change in the prediction of the PE+FP model when com-
pared to the PE model is illustrated in Figure 5. These file paths
are represented by four word clouds, one each for additional false
negatives, additional detections, additional true negatives, and ad-
ditional false positives, to get a representation that captures the
most frequent kinds of tokens in file paths that were detected or
misclassified. Common file roots such as “program files”, “appdata”,
etc were filtered out as stop words in order to avoid these words crowding
the analysis and suppressing more interesting patterns.
Looking at the word cloud for additional detections by the combined
model, we observed that app occurred very frequently. Upon further inspec-
tion, we discovered a family of Trojans that always had a file path of the
pattern: “[drive]\Users\[user]\appdata\local\temp\
[random 9 digit sequence]\app.exe”, with about 10000 such occur-
rences in the training set. Out of the 969 such occurrences in the test set,
we observed that the PE features only model detected just 152 variants,
whereas the PE + file path model detected an additional 575 samples as
malicious (at an FPR of 0.001). This improvement in detections at a low FPR
is very encouraging, and in line with the intuition for using file paths. We
observe several such occurrences that cause successful detections because
of patterns that malicious files exhibit in their file paths, with executables
residing in common Windows folders such as %SYSTEM%, %USERPROFILE%,
%APPDATA%, %SYSTEMPROFILE%, etc.
However, this does not mean that our model relies only on the file path
and makes trivial predictions. Since file paths are not used individually,
but as context along with PE content, the model seems to learn to dynam-
ically attribute value to different parts of the file path based on specific
patterns in file content that are unique to those files. In other words, there
is no single file path that can always cause a detection or a suppression
regardless of what file content is associated with it. This is clear when
we look at a set of malicious samples in our data that seem to imperson-
ate unfinished chrome downloads on disk. These files are of the pattern
“[drive]\Users\[user]\Downloads\Unconfirmed\
[random 6 digit sequence].crdownload”. Since both malicious and be-
nign files have similar file path patterns in this case, the detection rates for
both the combined (PE + FP) model and the content only (PE) model remain
virtually the same, signaling that the file path has almost no influence on
the prediction in this case.
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Figure 5: Word clouds generated from file paths where the prediction of the combined PE+FP model is different from the
prediction generated by the PE model. These file paths are then divided into four categories based on the initial and changed
predictions. In left→right top→bottom order, the word clouds are respectively file paths that are additional False Negatives,
additional Detections, additional True Negatives, and additional False Positives
While introducing file paths as an auxiliary input yields a compelling
performance improvement, in some scenarios, it also causes misclassifica-
tions. Based on the analysis of missed detections and false negatives from
PE+FP model, we observed the following modes of failure.
• Malicious files contained in system restore checkpoints and deleted
files in the recycle bin usually have completely randomly generated
filenames, with a very large percentage of them being benign. We
have observed that malicious files convicted with a low confidence
by the PE model are sometimes marked as benign by the PE+FP
model.
• Novel malicious files with names associated mostly with benign
files in the training set are also marked falsely as benign files. This
does not happen very often. The problem is most chronic in cases
when a large set of benign files with similar file paths are seen in
the training set, and the detection confidence from the PE features
is low. For example, in the False Negatives word cloud in Figure 5,
we see that file paths containing the words “time sheet”, “steam”,
“fleet info”, “payroll”, “departments”, etc are wrongly exoner-
ated, because these names are largely associated with benign files.
Fortunately, the occurrence of such failures seems to be quite low com-
pared to the number of files we are able to convict using file path information.
These failure modes also happen only when the PE model is almost com-
pletely ambivalent about its prediction. It is in this set of gray files that the
Table 2: Number of samples where ourmodel has additional
Detections and additional False Negatives as opposed to a
model using just the PE binary features, at different FPR lev-
els.
FPR
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1
Additional TPs 7796 9099 3601 2229 734
Additional FNs 90 475 1799 565 310
Net Gain 7706 8624 1802 1664 424
PE+FP model produces additional detections and suppresses false positives,
while occasionally missing a few detections. This is especially impressive
when considering that every sample in the test set is completely unseen in
the training distribution. Table 2 shows the net detection gain at different
FPR levels for the PE+FP model over the PE model.
We also see that the word clouds for additional true negatives and false
positives are almost identical. Since we are controlling for a fixed FPR while
generating the word clouds, it is important to note that the number of
additional true negatives is generally equal to the number of false positives.
However, the distribution changes, albeit slightly. From manual inspection,
we found that most files whose predictions changed to negatives/false
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positives were generally close to the decision threshold with randomly
generated components in their file paths, which likely cause minor changes
in predicted probabilities and the tendency to hop between predictions.
4.3 LIME Analysis
To ensure that our multi-view model has learned meaningful content from
PE file paths, we pick one of our trained models and employ Local Inter-
pretable Model-Agnostic Explanations (LIME) introduced by Ribiero et al. in
[36] to samples from the test set. LIME explanations assume that a trained
ML model, in our case f (x; θˆ ), can be explained by a simple interpretable
linear model locally, around an input x. Based on this assumption, which
the authors justify in [36], the linear model is trained to approximate f (x; θˆ )
within a neighborhood of x. The learned model weights are then used to
judge feature importance of the original deep model.
The definition of a realistic neighborhood around a specific input x is
problem specific, and represents the main challenge in adapting LIME to
our file path analysis. We generated the neighborhood samples, by first
tokenizing the file path by five delimeters: “\”, “/”, “.”, “_”, and “-”. We then
selected one random token to perturb. We crafted our perturbations by first
sampling a random number from the uniform distribution on R ∈ [0.0, 1.0].
If the number was greater than 0.5, we replaced the token with a random
string; if it was less than or equal to 0.5, we removed the token and preceding
delimiter.
After applying our perturbations, we then one-hot encoded all the pos-
sible tokens into a feature vector v. We fit each LIME classifier on N =
5000 such perturbations, labeling the original sample v(0), and the rest as
v(1) . . . v(N ). Similarly, we reconstituted, the modified strings x(1) . . . x(N ),
by recombining separators and tokens back into a full string.
As an example, consider the following file path:
C:\users\Bob\appdata\local\temp\rar\payment.scr.
This pre-processed file path, after substituting the drive and user name, will
be as follows:
[drive]\users\[user]\appdata\local\temp\rar\payment.scr.
Splitting on delimiters “\” and “.” yields 9 distinct tokens. We randomly
generate three more samples, which creates two new tokens, resulting in
11 distinct tokens in our example dataset:
v(1) =
[
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
]
,
v(2) =
[
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
]
,
v(3) =
[
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
]
,
where
v(0) =
[
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
]
.
Corresponding perturbations generated by our perturbation routine
appear as follows:
x(1) = [drive]\users\[user]\appdata\temp\rar\payment.scr
x(2) = [drive]\users\[user]\ztakzfw\local\temp\rar\payment.scr,
x(3) = [drive]\users\[user]\nhus11n\local\temp\rar\payment.scr.
In our example x(1)5 , corresponding to token “local” has a value of 0, since it
no longer exists in the string. In x(2), we perturb the delimiter corresponding
to “appdata”, replacing it by a random string and thus generating a token
that did not exist in the original sample. We do this again for x(3) with
another random string.
Consistent with Ribiero et al., we fit our model using Lasso regression –
least squares regression with an L1 penalty, which has the effect of encour-
aging sparsity in the explanation. The overall optimization objective of the
LIME explanation model is:
argmin
ϕ
N∑
i=0
wi
(
ϕT v(i ) − f (x(i ); θˆ )
)2
+ λ | |ϕ | |1, (3)
where ϕ are the parameter weights of the LIME model, λ is the weight
regularization penalty, and wi is the weight associated with the i th sample.
For our implementation, we used Scikit-learn’s [32] default Lasso regression
implementation, with λ value of 0.01, which we observed induce a sparse
solution. For numerical stability, here we take f (·) to be the prediction of
the network prior to the sigmoid output.
Ribiero et al. recommend computing w using distance kernel from the
original sample to the target sample. This is enforce locality so that per-
turbations closer to the original sample contribute more to the regression
objective. For our formulation, all perturbations have approximately the
same semantic distance, so set w1 . . .wN to 1.0, and w0 =
∑N
j=1w j , in
order to give enough weight to the one original sample so the prediction
approximately matches the original f (x; θˆ ) values after fitting.
We visualized the computed Lasso model weights for several interesting
examples in Figure 6, by overlaying the computed weights on top of the file
path string.
In the first positive example we can see that that the token “kmsauto” is
being identified as a maliciousness indicator by our PE+FP model. KMS Auto
is legally dubious Microsoft product activator, and this file is identified as
“PUA:Win32/AutoKMS” by Microsoft. Similar, in the second second positive
example our PE+FP model gave high score to “pcrepairkit”. Repair kits
are typically questionable software products that usually contain spyware
or malware.
On the other hand, in the several negative examples we can see that man-
agement tools are being down-weighted by the PE+FP model, as compared
to the PE model. Management tools are notoriously difficult to distinguish
from spyware, as their functionality is basically the same, the only difference
is intent of the user. In this case using filepath information provided us more
context for the detection, thus allowing more accurate identification by the
PE+FP model. We note that these are a few interesting examples, and that
the relative contributions of tokens also have a non-linear dependency on
the file content itself. For example, when we kept the same path for the first
negative example, but replaced the file with a randomly chosen malicious
file, the importance of the token “management” was significantly reduced.
Finally, we performed an aggregate LIME analysis to identify prominent
tokens throughout our dataset, by choosing 200 samples from our test data
set to analyze – 100 with a malicious ground truth label and 100 with a
benign ground truth label. The first 100 of these samples consisted of positive
ground truth label test samples where the score from the PE+FP model most
significantly increased beyond that of PE baseline. The second 100 consisted
of negative ground truth label samples where the score of the PE+FP model
most significantly decreased beneath the score of the PE baseline. Note that
measuring most significant increase and most significant decrease, on raw
output scores is potentially problematic because different models – even
ones with bounded sigmoid outputs – may have fundamentally different
score scales between 0 and 1. Therefore, we performed calibration via
isotonic regression on scores over the validation set for each model before
assessing score differences. We then aggregated LIME parameter weights
across tokens (θi j ) and normalized by token frequency, looking at tokens of
highest and lowest weights for the selected 200 samples. The top 10 tokens
which increased and decreased response are shown in Table 3.
The results of running our LIME analysis, are shown in Table 3. For
malicious samples, we see that the tokens of highest weight consisted of
strings with randomized content, that were not cryptographic digests, per-
haps an attempt at obfuscation. The remaining high-weight token, setup
is perhaps indicative of an infected installer. Tokens with large negative
weights consist of common looking benign software names, as one might
expect. Of the benign samples that we assessed, tokens that increased re-
sponse tended to have very short length, e.g., “t”, “d”, and “z”, very high or
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(a) Positive (Increase)
(b) Negative (Decrease)
Figure 6: Example file paths from our LIME analysis with (a) positive and (b) negative ground truth labels. The path tokens
are highlighted based on the Lasso weights, as computed by the LIME model. As the model is linear, the token weights can be
directly interpreted as eithermaking the overall malware score higher (red weights) or lower (blue weights). The color shading
is proportional to weight amplitude, i.e., darker red and blue shades correspond to greater magnitude weights, while lighter
shades correspond to smaller magnitudes. White color corresponds to no impact.
Table 3: Tokens and corresponding weights from our LIME analysis that most amplified and attenuated responses for mali-
cious and benign samples. For the malicious samples analyzed, tokens that resulted in greatest increase and greatest decrease
in classification score are shown in (a) and (b). Corresponding tokens for the benign samples are shown in (c) and (d). Malicious
samples were selected from the 100 samples from the test data set where the ground truth label was malicious and the cali-
brated score from the PE+File Path model increased the most above the calibrated score from the PE model. Benign samples
were similarly selected from the pruned data set according to the most significant drop in calibrated score.
(a) Increase (Malicious)
Token Weight
2786 7.436
4327 5.854
8o0sdtwhrxkz 4.213
28pygyuokzwwn 3.826
wfzctyetugjwxxuy 3.736
3015798005 3.592
setup 3.313
jzljumnkfaapzpqq 3.183
whyovxk3mplt6 3.167
1467 2.219
(b) Decrease (Malicious)
Token Weight
onv2k -6.677
computerz -6.433
westlake -5.565
editor -5.13
printingtools -4.738
videodecodesdk -3.687
placar80 -3.663
movavistatistics -3.556
enterprise -3.488
jarvee -3.401
(c) Increase (Benign)
Token Weight
miner 9.369
z 8.163
2639 6.876
mineropt 6.507
2198205786 6.28
systemprofile 4.26
xxxxx 4.193
t 3.916
d 3.812
namespace 3.441
(d) Decrease (Benign)
Token Weight
msi61f0 -8.04
part -7.022
ciscosparklauncher -6.642
sesinaci -4.738
clientinst -4.445
safesenderslist -4.443
setup -4.389
sd -4.147
wim -4.06
ie8shims -3.996
very low entropy, e.g., “219805786” and “xxxxx”, and have “miner” in their
names, e.g., “miner”, “mineropt” – indicating the likely presence of a (be-
nign) cryptocurrency miner, potentially downloaded by the user voluntarily.
It is not surprising that the string “miner” increased response as many types
of malware and potentially unwanted benignware steal CPU cycles to mine
cryptocurrency. With respect to tokens that most attenuated the response,
they appear to be components of standard software. Interestingly, “setup”
tends to attenuate response for the benignware that we analyzed, indicating
that the behavior of tokens depends on their contexutal location within
the file path. Note that, as LIME involves fitting a classifier per sample,
this analysis is limited only to the samples that we analyzed. However, it
suggests that our neural network is learning to extract useful contextual
information from file paths; not just mere data artifacts.
4.4 Model Debugging with LIME
As seen in Section 4.3 above, LIME can serve to interpret which parts of
test samples triggered a high or low classification response. In this section,
we highlight the ability of lime to help debug overfitting in models and
ensure that seemingly optimistic test results are not driven by spurious
correlations.
During our initial experiments, when we performed LIME analysis on a
trained PE + FPmodel, we observed some interesting patterns among tokens
with a disproportionately high response. The tokens that triggered the
greatest increase were all hexadecimal digests that seemed to be associated
with malicious PE files named with the SHA256 digest of their contents.
These LIME results are presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
We concluded that these high-response tokens come from customers
who were intentionally testing the detection capability of the source vendor
from which we obtained our data set. This is likely a standard and fairly
common occurrence, as the easiest1 way to test an anti-virus engine is to
simply download known malware datasets, and see if they are detected.
While this type of data is a microcosm of malware and benignware “in-the-
wild” distributions, it is not representative of realistic threats and using this
data in our analysis could lead to an overly optimistic measure of FP and
PE+FP performance.
Therefore, as we mentioned in Section 3.1, we removed all samples from
the test set with file paths containing the names “malware”, “prevalent”,
and our source organization’s name, as well as strings of length 10 or greater
1We do not think this is actually a good way to test vendor efficacy, as the test can
clearly be gamed by a file path model such as ours, as well as in the cloud blacklists.
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with hexadecimal-only characters, corresponding to hash digests and re-ran
our evaluation. This reduced the size of our test set from 275374 to 249783;
by 25591 samples.
Comparative model performances on the unpruned test set are shown
in ROCs in Figure A.3 of the appendix and in tabular form in Table A.2.
Figure A.3 demonstrates the difference in model performance before and
after dataset filtering. As expected, we see slightly better performance from
the PE+FP model on the unpruned data set, since all the easy-to-classify
file paths are included in this dataset. The performance of the content-only
(PE) model is largely unchanged by pruning, while the performance of
the file path (FP) model is diminished by pruning. We present this result
to demonstrate the importance of selecting a meaningful/representative
test set, particularly when dealing with multiple input types, and also to
highlight the utility of LIME in model debugging.
5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss practical applications and potential issues of
associated with deploying our multi-view model. First, in Section 5.1, we
explore the vulnerability of our model in an adversarial setting. Then in
Section 5.2 we explore the utility of our model in an endpoint detection and
response (EDR) context.
5.1 Sensitivity to Adversarial Attacks
A natural concern when using file paths for static detection is that an
attacker has a fair bit of control over where on the system malware can
reside. This adds another input which an adversary can manipulate to evade
detection – much as a PE content-only model can be evaded, e.g., by adding
overlays from benign software, a PE+FP model can potentially be evaded
by using common paths from benign files and/or by modifying PE content.
Defense/hardening against adversarial attacks is an active area of research in
the anti-malware and ML-Sec communities, which we consider addressing
beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is important to be aware of
the potential issue that adversarial attacks pose for static ML detectors and
particularly for our model.
In practice, all deployed static ML detectors that we are aware of have
some susceptibility to adversarial attacks. However, most vendor products
contain a variety of detection methods – both ML-based and non-ML-based,
somewhat ameliorating the threat. In these contexts, the role of static ML
detectors is to serve as an accurate filter that catches malware at scale in a
manner independent of other detection components in the anti-malware
stack– not necessarily as a catch-all solution. At the time of this writing we
are also unaware of widespread adversarial attacks in the wild. Thus, while
the potential sensitivity to adversarial attacks is important to acknowledge,
this does not preclude using our model for many production applications.
Finally, the practical nature of altering file location of a piece of malware
could inherently diminish its effectiveness: as discussed in Section 1, file
paths which provide the most useful information are often specifically
chosen for a reason – e.g., to evade disk scans or to increase the likelihood
that a user will open an infected application. Thus an adversary might
become less effective in a malware campaign by altering these chosen file
paths.
5.2 Applications in Endpoint Detection and
Response (EDR)
Some organizations might consider deploying the PE+FP model on an end-
point in blocking mode as high-risk due to potentially unexpected behavior
and concerns about adversarial manipulations,
In these cases, the PE+FP model can be moved to the backend, and used
in an Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) context, by augmenting
Security Operations Center (SOC) team’s threat hunting operations. Here
our PE+FP model can be used as a secondary model to flag samples that
Figure 7: Precision curves for the PE only model and the
multi-view model as a function of budget, ranging from 10
to 50000 samples. PE only model precision is shown using
the blue dotted line and the multi-view model precision is
shown using the red dashed line. Note that the x-axis uses a
logarithmic scale
registered below the FPR threshold of the deployment model as suspicious
for inspection by human analysts. In these settings there is a budget in
terms of samples that human analysts can inspect (manual detection is time
consuming).
To evaluate the suitability of our model in an EDR setting, we use the
following methodology: We threshold a trained PE model at an FPR of 10−3,
which reflects a typical deployment use case, convicting samples which it
is highly certain about as malicious, i.e., any event for which the model
output is higher than the threshold is considered a certain malicious event.
Excluding these convicted samples from our analysis, we then demonstrate
how the PE+FP model can improve precision in retrieving malicious events
for budgets ranging from 10 up to 50000 events, where the budget is defined
as howmany samples can be manually inspected by humans. Figure 7 shows
a performance comparison of the precision at different budgets, when using
the PE only model and the multi-view model in an EDR use case.
It is clear from the plot that the multi-view model retrieves significantly
more malicious events for a given budget, especially for lower budgets.
This suggests that our multi-view model could be used effectively in an
EDR application that does not require a large change in existing static ML
deployments, but yields significant detection gains during threat hunting.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper we have demonstrated that deep neural network malware de-
tectors can benefit from contextual information from file paths, even when
this information is not inherently malicious or benign. Adding file paths
to our detection model did not require any additional endpoint instrumen-
tation, and provided a statistically significant improvement in the overall
ROC curve, throughout relevant FPR regions. The fact that we measured
the performance of our models directly on a customer endpoint distribution
suggests that our multi-viewmodel can practically be deployed to endpoints,
even though there are some logistical and user interface issues that might
need to be addressed, since moving a file between directories could change
the detection scores.
One potentially powerful spin-off of our multi-view detection approach
would be to use it in a behavioral detection engine, i.e., use static features
along with behavioral data as auxiliary inputs. There, rather than relying on
London ’19, November 11–15, 2019, London, UK Adarsh Kyadige, Ethan M. Rudd, and Konstantin Berlin
highly voluminous system calls for detection, we can potentially boost the
effectiveness of a simple system that tracks only file write, execution, and
process spawning, by combining the process path, action, and target, with
the associated static features. Our approach could also be easily extended
to a variety of other malware types and contextual sources as well as other
security applications. For example, detecting cross-site-scripting attacks
(XSS), where we could use textual HTML and JavaScript, the URL itself, and
a rendered image of the website as separate inputs to a multi-view model.
The LIME analysis that we conducted in Section 5 demonstrates that
the multi-view model learns to distill contextual information suggestive
of actual malicious/benign concepts; not merely statistical artifacts of the
dataset, though as we observed, it can learn such artifacts as well. This
underscores the need for data that reflects deployment use cases as well.
Interestingly, techniques like LIME have applications beyond validating
whether our model has learned the proper concepts. For example, in an
endpoint detection and response (EDR) context, where analytic tools allow
users that are not malware/forensics experts to perform some degree of
threat hunting, we would like to be able to let users see suspicious file paths
on disk. Doing this with a similarity comparison to known file paths could
potentially reveal PII of other customers. Importance highlighting, like we
illustrated in Figure 6, is potentially a powerful PII-free alternative to the
nearest neighbor approach.
One area which we plan to explore in future work is how to addition-
ally utilize the large number of already labeled malware and benignware
from intelligence feeds to boost training. Such feeds provide vastly greater
malware diversity than typically exists on customer endpoints, since they
rarely get infected. Unfortunately, those feeds do not provide file paths
associated with actual infected files in the wild, and our current training
regime assumes that both content and contextual data are always present
during training. While several methods have been proposed for dealing
with missing data [16], it is not clear how to best apply these methods to
file paths for our multi-view model.
Finally, our fixed-length convolutional embedding for file paths is not
the only featurization scheme that we could employ. While the size of our
dataset discourages training with recurrent neural networks due to lengthy
training times, frameworks like PyTorch [31] trivially support different
input lengths during training – even for convolutional feed-forward models,
so long as the intermediate convolution outputs are combined to a fixed
dimension prior to hitting fully connected layers.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 File Path Lengths
Figure A.1: file path length distribution. Note the logarithmic scale on the y-axis. The vast majority of file paths are length
300 or less.
When selecting the input window size for our file path arm, we first examined the distribution of file path lengths from our training set. A histogram of
frequencies is shown in Figure A.1. From this distribution, we initially decided to trim our file path input size to the last 300 characters. This captures the vast
majority of file paths. During early experimentation, however, we found that this led to lengthy training times. In the interest of reporting uncertainty margins
for each model (see Section 4), which requires fitting multiple models, and due to our limited Amazon Web Services (AWS) budget, we first trained two models
– one that takes the last 300 characters as input and another that takes the last 100 characters as input and performed a comparison on our unfiltered test set.
As shown in Figure A.2, the performance of the length 100 model is only slightly worse than that of the length 300 model. Thus, we trimmed file paths to the
last 100 characters for our experiments.
Figure A.2: Performance comparison of a FP model trained using an input window size of 300 vs. an input size of 100. The
length 300 model takes substantially longer to train and yields only slightly better performance.
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A.2 LIME for the Unfiltered Test Set
Table A.1: Tokens and responses from our LIME analysis selected from our unpruned dataset which (a) most increased the
model’s score for malicious samples, (b) decreased the model’s score for malicious samples, (c) increased the model’s score
for benign samples, (d) decreased the model’s score for malicious samples. Characters in the middle of tokens greater than 24
characters in length were replaced with “...” for readability. All of these lengthy strings contain hex digests. Malicious samples
were selected from the 100 samples from the unpruned data set where the ground truth label was malicious and the calibrated
score from the PE+FP model increased the most above the calibrated score from the PE model. Benign samples were similarly
selected from the unpruned data set according to themost significant drop in calibrated score. Tokens showing [xx. . .xx], have
been redacted for review and PII reasons.
(a) Increase (Malicious)
Token Weight
48bc9c40206c...bb5ebab2b3ea 26.115
1b62d0d9813d...2748ab0131a7 25.659
1764c2d644e6...60faebdb50d1 17.801
3bd39229b7ad...fc8c544b9981 15.978
25689805bb60...b1939907e6f9 15.967
d108e027c5d1...45e3820e79f2 15.505
6bae1743e31f...48f09f0bc49c 14.718
63bbd56b2099...9d9032cfad61 13.647
f72f6b477b35...c6dd77700546 13.639
ac255cc64451...7e9fa7d8a74f 13.292
(b) Decrease (Malicious)
Token Weight
glwnv -7.503
ghy6n -7.214
crashreports -6.962
[xxxxxxxxx]...a20d40fe645d -6.789
dll -5.928
[xxxx]engineeringtools -5.734
welivzoqf3uils -5.711
glx9azsenh1mgt -5.576
part -4.871
5iofk3xeixypt2 -4.833
(c) Increase (Benign)
Token Weight
cravingexplorer 13.464
bundled 9.034
auto~system~care 6.431
auscsetup 5.048
ubzobezzie4db 5.018
uxu5gqh 4.895
fla4476 4.89
jvuqb6pzvtju2g1 4.883
ekvzxxm 4.608
85qpk7evakbqzeo 4.372
(d) Decrease (Benign)
Token Weight
msi8a92 -15.498
robloxplayerlauncher -12.347
ultimate -8.59
debugview++ -7.885
registerdll -7.424
digiarty -7.375
steganos -7.221
updates -7.053
zpsiohortfa -6.421
fslib -5.944
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A.3 Performance Evaluation on the Unfiltered Test Set
Figure A.3: Mean ROC curves and standard deviations evaluating on the pruned (solid lines) and unpruned (dotted lines) test
sets for comparison. PE+FP model results are shown in red. PE model results are shown in blue. FP model results are shown
in green. Mean and standard deviations were evaluated over five random network initializations.
Table A.2: Top: Mean and standard deviation true positive rates (TPRs) from evaluating our trained models on the unpruned
test set at false positive rates (FPRs) of interest. Results were aggregated over five training runs with different weight initial-
izations and minibatch orderings. Best results, shown in bold consistently occurred when using both feature vectors from the
file and contextual file path as inputs (PE+FP). Bottom: percentage reduction in mean detection error achieved by using the
the PE+FP model in comparison to the baseline content-only model (PE).
FPR
10−5 10−4 10−3 10−2 10−1
PE+FP TPR (0.994 ± 0.001 AUC) 0.411 ± 0.072 0.626 ± 0.006 0.749 ± 0.003 0.938 ± 0.003 0.984 ± 0.005
PE TPR (0.991 ± 0.001 AUC) 0.135 ± 0.063 0.304 ± 0.07 0.570 ± 0.008 0.885 ± 0.009 0.975 ± 0.007
FP TPR (0.975 ± 0.002 AUC) 0.091 ± 0.063 0.365 ± 0.018 0.609 ± 0.003 0.768 ± 0.001 0.945 ± 0.002
% Detection Error Reduction 31.9 46.3 41.7 46.1 35.5
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A.4 Baseline Model Diagrams
Figure A.4: The PEmodel. Each of the unlabeled blocks contains a fully connected layer, followed by Layer Normalization and
a Dropout layer.
Figure A.5: The FPmodel. Each of the unlabeled blocks contains a fully connected layer, followed by Layer Normalization and
a Dropout layer.
